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Synology DiskStation DS223 DSM 7.2.2-72806

pending review

uploaded by admin ·

SquashFS image · squashfs · redboot · 309.0 MiB

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About this dump

Source

Downloaded from Synology's public download server: DSM_DS223_72806.pat

Format and unpacking

  • Container: Synology signed 0xADBEEF archive — 0xADBEEF header magic, msgpack header + 64-byte Ed25519 signature, then entries (high-entropy, no filesystem magic before decryption).
  • Encryption: each entry is XChaCha20-Poly1305 secretstream (libsodium); per-entry key = crypto_kdf_derive_from_key(master_key, subkey_id, ctx) with subkey_id/ctx from the header.
  • Tool: synacktiv/synodecrypt via a local libsodium (ctypes) + msgpack shim.
  • Key (reverse-engineered): the key table is baked into the proprietary libsynocodesign.so. I extracted libsynocodesign.so.7 from usr/lib/ inside hda1.tgz of the plaintext DSM 7.0.1-42218 DS920+ .pat, then brute-force-recovered the keys by sliding a 32-byte window over the .so and testing against a real target: Ed25519 signing key 64faba48feec6c8a2484d2489a11418a0e980317a9cc6b392f1041925b293fe0 at .so offset 0x23830; XChaCha20 master key 078a7529a07a998cffadb87d7378993b7d9ccfa7171f5c47f150838a6a7caf61 at adjacent offset 0x23858. Keys are stable across DSM 7.x.

Verification

  • Ed25519 header signature verified OK against the recovered signing key.
  • All per-entry BLAKE2b checksums matched (synodecrypt warns on mismatch; none).
  • Output is a valid tar: VERSION productversion=7.2.2, build=72806, unique=synology_rtd1619b_ds223.
  • Contains zImage kernel, rd.bin ramdisk and hda1.tgz root filesystem.

Contents

  • zImage kernel, rd.bin ramdisk and hda1.tgz root filesystem.
  • Platform: Realtek RTD1619B (ARM Cortex-A55, 2-bay).
  • Uploaded the decrypted tar.

Credit

Method reference: afflicted.sh / tpbreak.

Technical fingerprint

SquashFS image · squashfs · redboot

entropy 7.94 bits/byte · analysed 256.0 MiB (the leading part of a larger file)

Mostly compressed. 89% is compressed or encrypted data; the structures below mark where the streams and filesystems start.

  • compressed or encrypted 89%
  • code or packed data 6%
  • text and tables 4%
  • padding or empty 1%

Structures by offset

OffsetStructureKind
0x0 tar File format
0x101 tar Filesystem
0x63ba00 xz Compression
0x63e5bf gzip Compression
0xc1d9d6 bzip2 Compression
0x3b99d80 zip Compression
0xee3162d u-boot Bootloader
0xee36233 lzop Compression
0xee364aa fat Filesystem
0xeee0a80 redboot Bootloader
0xfa2ef7d ubi Filesystem
0xfa2ef89 ubifs Filesystem
0xfa2f1e2 xfs Filesystem
0xfa30a5b btrfs Filesystem
0xfa30a6b cramfs Filesystem
0xfa30b38 f2fs Filesystem
0xfa30e5d ntfs Filesystem
0xfa30ef8 romfs Filesystem
0xfa30f01 squashfs Filesystem

What's inside

FieldDetected information
File format tar
Bootloader redboot 0xeee0a80u-boot 0xee3162d
Filesystem btrfs 0xfa30a5bcramfs 0xfa30a6bf2fs 0xfa30b38ntfs 0xfa30e5dromfs 0xfa30ef8squashfs 0xfa30f01ubi 0xfa2ef7dubifs 0xfa2ef89xfs 0xfa2f1e2fat 0xee364aatar 0x101
Compression lzop 0xee36233bzip2 0xc1d9d6xz 0x63ba00zip 0x3b99d80gzip 0x63e5bf
Archive members DiskCompatibilityDB.tar

Symbols

3 names from the symbol tables of 1 ELF/PE file and strings that are symbols (capped: there may be more). A name searches the site for it; an offset opens the hex viewer there.

NameKindOffset
vAX4SB string 0x181cd53
vBl_b4 string 0x2b683fc
jKo26N string 0x3d887fb