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Dump TP-Link Archer AX73 (v1, AX5400) 1.2.0 Build 20221103, uploaded by admin, 2 versions.

Newest first: the vendor, product, version, license and notes of every version, and what changed since the version before it. Notes are rendered from their source as the site renders them today. A dump keeps its original metadata and up to 49 edits. The file itself never changes: its hashes are fixed at upload.

Edit 1

current by admin · 1h ago #1
VendorTP-Link
ProductArcher AX73 (v1, AX5400)
Version1.2.0 Build 20221103
Licensevendor-proprietary, research use only

Source

Downloaded from TP-Link's public firmware server: Archer AX73(US)_V1_221103.zip (inner file ax73v1-us-up-ver1-2-0-P1[20221103-rel61829]_2048_nosign_...bin). This is the newest Archer AX73 build that uses the packed RSA-2048 + AES format; later AX73 builds (V1 1.3.5, V2) switched to RSA-1024 sign-only with an un-encrypted payload.

Format and unpacking

  • Container: TP-Link router firmware with a fw-type: header at offset 0x14; the payload is high-entropy (8.000 bits/byte), no filesystem magic visible before decryption (packed).
  • Encryption: RSA-2048 signature + AES-128-CBC. The AES key/IV is the RSA-PSS salt, recovered while verifying the image signature with TP-Link's RSA public key (TP-Link's own GPL libsecurity scheme).
  • Tool: MyElectronic/tp-link-decrypt (Watchful_IP), rebuilt with the router signing key.
  • Key (reverse-engineered from TP-Link's own firmware): the router RSA-2048 public key RSA_1 = the BgIAAAwk...docMd... PUBLICKEYBLOB. I extracted it from usr/bin/nvrammanager inside the UBIFS rootfs of TP-Link's own ax6000 v2 reference image (ax6000v2-up-ver1-1-2-P1[20230731-rel41066]..._nosign...bin.rollback, from download.tplinkcloud.com). The UBI was carved from the reference and unpacked with ubi_reader (installed from PyPI into a venv). Authenticity check: SHA-256 of the two extracted keys (RSA_0 Tapo + RSA_1 router), joined, equals 0a7857d40fb02ff1b8d3cbce769e6c402a82a8094b4af553c54e4ffbdc4b6e64 — the value pinned in the tool's key-extraction script.
  • Recovered for this image: KEY=f11fbdf0d0b104b4df16aaca289561b9, IV=471a27a187d1bb480a9ba58274d69357.

Verification

  • RSA-PSS signature verified OK against the extracted RSA_1 public key (authenticates the image and confirms the key).
  • Decrypted payload contains a U-Boot FIT image (magic d00dfeed at 0x12ca) and a UBI rootfs at 0x381252 with 400 UBI EC headers (UBI#) spaced exactly 128 KiB apart — valid structure that cannot arise from a wrong key.
  • Broadcom and Archer strings present in the decrypted payload.

Contents

  • FIT kernel image + UBI root filesystem.
  • SoC: Broadcom BCM6750 (Archer AX73 / AX5400, Wi-Fi 6).
  • Uploaded the decrypted image.

Credit

Method reference: afflicted.sh / tpbreak.

Changes from the previous version
  • Version: 1.2.0 Build 20221103 (newest AX73 build on the packed RSA-20 → 1.2.0 Build 20221103

Original

by admin · 2h ago #0
VendorTP-Link
ProductArcher AX73 (v1, AX5400)
Version1.2.0 Build 20221103 (newest AX73 build on the packed RSA-20
Licensevendor-proprietary, research use only

Source

Downloaded from TP-Link's public firmware server: Archer AX73(US)_V1_221103.zip (inner file ax73v1-us-up-ver1-2-0-P1[20221103-rel61829]_2048_nosign_...bin). This is the newest Archer AX73 build that uses the packed RSA-2048 + AES format; later AX73 builds (V1 1.3.5, V2) switched to RSA-1024 sign-only with an un-encrypted payload.

Format and unpacking

  • Container: TP-Link router firmware with a fw-type: header at offset 0x14; the payload is high-entropy (8.000 bits/byte), no filesystem magic visible before decryption (packed).
  • Encryption: RSA-2048 signature + AES-128-CBC. The AES key/IV is the RSA-PSS salt, recovered while verifying the image signature with TP-Link's RSA public key (TP-Link's own GPL libsecurity scheme).
  • Tool: MyElectronic/tp-link-decrypt (Watchful_IP), rebuilt with the router signing key.
  • Key (reverse-engineered from TP-Link's own firmware): the router RSA-2048 public key RSA_1 = the BgIAAAwk...docMd... PUBLICKEYBLOB. I extracted it from usr/bin/nvrammanager inside the UBIFS rootfs of TP-Link's own ax6000 v2 reference image (ax6000v2-up-ver1-1-2-P1[20230731-rel41066]..._nosign...bin.rollback, from download.tplinkcloud.com). The UBI was carved from the reference and unpacked with ubi_reader (installed from PyPI into a venv). Authenticity check: SHA-256 of the two extracted keys (RSA_0 Tapo + RSA_1 router), joined, equals 0a7857d40fb02ff1b8d3cbce769e6c402a82a8094b4af553c54e4ffbdc4b6e64 — the value pinned in the tool's key-extraction script.
  • Recovered for this image: KEY=f11fbdf0d0b104b4df16aaca289561b9, IV=471a27a187d1bb480a9ba58274d69357.

Verification

  • RSA-PSS signature verified OK against the extracted RSA_1 public key (authenticates the image and confirms the key).
  • Decrypted payload contains a U-Boot FIT image (magic d00dfeed at 0x12ca) and a UBI rootfs at 0x381252 with 400 UBI EC headers (UBI#) spaced exactly 128 KiB apart — valid structure that cannot arise from a wrong key.
  • Broadcom and Archer strings present in the decrypted payload.

Contents

  • FIT kernel image + UBI root filesystem.
  • SoC: Broadcom BCM6750 (Archer AX73 / AX5400, Wi-Fi 6).
  • Uploaded the decrypted image.

Credit

Method reference: afflicted.sh / tpbreak.