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TP-Link Archer AX73 (v1, AX5400) 1.2.0 Build 20221103

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uploaded by admin · · edited

SquashFS image · arm · Ubuntu · ubifs · cfe · 53.5 MiB

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About this dump

Source

Downloaded from TP-Link's public firmware server: Archer AX73(US)_V1_221103.zip (inner file ax73v1-us-up-ver1-2-0-P1[20221103-rel61829]_2048_nosign_...bin). This is the newest Archer AX73 build that uses the packed RSA-2048 + AES format; later AX73 builds (V1 1.3.5, V2) switched to RSA-1024 sign-only with an un-encrypted payload.

Format and unpacking

  • Container: TP-Link router firmware with a fw-type: header at offset 0x14; the payload is high-entropy (8.000 bits/byte), no filesystem magic visible before decryption (packed).
  • Encryption: RSA-2048 signature + AES-128-CBC. The AES key/IV is the RSA-PSS salt, recovered while verifying the image signature with TP-Link's RSA public key (TP-Link's own GPL libsecurity scheme).
  • Tool: MyElectronic/tp-link-decrypt (Watchful_IP), rebuilt with the router signing key.
  • Key (reverse-engineered from TP-Link's own firmware): the router RSA-2048 public key RSA_1 = the BgIAAAwk...docMd... PUBLICKEYBLOB. I extracted it from usr/bin/nvrammanager inside the UBIFS rootfs of TP-Link's own ax6000 v2 reference image (ax6000v2-up-ver1-1-2-P1[20230731-rel41066]..._nosign...bin.rollback, from download.tplinkcloud.com). The UBI was carved from the reference and unpacked with ubi_reader (installed from PyPI into a venv). Authenticity check: SHA-256 of the two extracted keys (RSA_0 Tapo + RSA_1 router), joined, equals 0a7857d40fb02ff1b8d3cbce769e6c402a82a8094b4af553c54e4ffbdc4b6e64 — the value pinned in the tool's key-extraction script.
  • Recovered for this image: KEY=f11fbdf0d0b104b4df16aaca289561b9, IV=471a27a187d1bb480a9ba58274d69357.

Verification

  • RSA-PSS signature verified OK against the extracted RSA_1 public key (authenticates the image and confirms the key).
  • Decrypted payload contains a U-Boot FIT image (magic d00dfeed at 0x12ca) and a UBI rootfs at 0x381252 with 400 UBI EC headers (UBI#) spaced exactly 128 KiB apart — valid structure that cannot arise from a wrong key.
  • Broadcom and Archer strings present in the decrypted payload.

Contents

  • FIT kernel image + UBI root filesystem.
  • SoC: Broadcom BCM6750 (Archer AX73 / AX5400, Wi-Fi 6).
  • Uploaded the decrypted image.

Credit

Method reference: afflicted.sh / tpbreak.

Technical fingerprint

SquashFS image · arm · Ubuntu · ubifs · cfe

entropy 7.65 bits/byte · analysed 53.5 MiB

Mostly compressed. 87% is compressed or encrypted data; the structures below mark where the streams and filesystems start.

  • compressed or encrypted 87%
  • code or packed data 6%
  • text and tables 4%
  • padding or empty 4%

Structures by offset

OffsetStructureKind
0x6c1b8 cfe Bootloader
0xa1d19 gzip Compression
0x381252 ubi Filesystem

What's inside

FieldDetected information
Architecture arm 0x179e
Operating system Ubuntu 0x707da
Bootloader cfe 0x6c1b8
Filesystem ubi 0x381252ubifs at 0x3c2252 0x6cf92jffs2 0x6d2fasquashfs 0x6da06
Compression gzip 0xa1d19lzma 0x6d8fd
Web server Embedded HTTP server 0x6e14c
Libraries & daemons OpenSSL libcrypto 0x1390973libpthread 0xbf634alibstdc++ 0x139c53a

Symbols

448 names from strings that are symbols. A name searches the site for it; an offset opens the hex viewer there.

28 more listed here

408 more not listed: symbol search finds them all, with sym:name or name*.