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Dump Synology DiskStation DS923+ DSM 7.2.2-72806, uploaded by admin, 2 versions.

Newest first: the vendor, product, version, license and notes of every version, and what changed since the version before it. Notes are rendered from their source as the site renders them today. A dump keeps its original metadata and up to 49 edits. The file itself never changes: its hashes are fixed at upload.

Edit 1

current by admin · 2h ago #1
VendorSynology
ProductDiskStation DS923+
VersionDSM 7.2.2-72806
Licensevendor-proprietary, research use only

Source

Downloaded from Synology's public download server: https://global.synologydownload.com/download/DSM/release/7.2.2/72806/DSM_DS923+_72806.pat.

Format and unpacking

  • Container: Synology signed 0xADBEEF archive — 0xADBEEF header magic, msgpack header + 64-byte Ed25519 signature, then 55 entries (entropy ~8.0 bits/byte from the start).
  • Encryption: each entry is XChaCha20-Poly1305 secretstream (libsodium); per-entry key = crypto_kdf_derive_from_key(master_key, subkey_id, ctx) with subkey_id/ctx from the header.
  • Tool: synacktiv/synodecrypt via a local libsodium (ctypes) + msgpack shim.
  • Key (reverse-engineered): the key table is baked into the proprietary libsynocodesign.so. I extracted libsynocodesign.so.7 from usr/lib/ inside hda1.tgz of the plaintext DSM 7.0.1-42218 DS920+ .pat, then brute-force-recovered the keys by sliding a 32-byte window over the .so and testing against the real target: Ed25519 signing key 64faba48feec6c8a2484d2489a11418a0e980317a9cc6b392f1041925b293fe0 at .so offset 0x23830; XChaCha20 master key 078a7529a07a998cffadb87d7378993b7d9ccfa7171f5c47f150838a6a7caf61 at adjacent offset 0x23858. Keys are stable across DSM 7.x (a 2021 library decrypts this 2024 build).

Verification

  • Ed25519 header signature verified OK.
  • All per-entry BLAKE2b checksums matched.
  • Output is a valid tar: VERSION productversion=7.2.2, build=72806, unique=synology_r1000_923+.
  • Includes zImage, rd.gz, hda1.tgz, Synology.sig.

Contents

  • Kernel zImage + rd.gz ramdisk + hda1.tgz rootfs.
  • Platform: AMD Ryzen R1600, x86_64.
  • Uploaded the decrypted tar.

Credit

Method reference: afflicted.sh / tpbreak.

Changes from the previous version

Notes (source)

<p>Source: Synology public download server (https://global.synologydownload.com/download/DSM/release/7.2.2/72806/DSM_DS923+_72806.pat). PACKED: Synology signed 0xADBEEF archive (header magic 0xADBEEF, entropy 8.000 bits/byte from the start), msgpack header + Ed25519 signature, 55 entries encrypted with XChaCha20-Poly1305 secretstream (libsodium), per-entry key via crypto_kdf_derive_from_key(master_key, subkey_id, ctx). Decrypted with synacktiv/synodecrypt (https://github.com/synacktiv/synodecrypt) + a local libsodium(ctypes)/msgpack shim. Keys reverse-engineered from libsynocodesign.so.7 (extracted from usr/lib of hda1.tgz in the plaintext DSM 7.0.1-42218 DS920+ .pat): Ed25519 signing key 64faba48...5b293fe0 at .so offset 0x23830, XChaCha20 master key 078a7529...6a7caf61 at 0x23858 (recovered by brute-force window-matching against the real .pat signature/first-entry; keys stable across DSM 7.x). Verification: Ed25519 header signature OK; all per-entry BLAKE2b checksums matched; output is a valid tar - VERSION productversion=7.2.2 build=72806 unique=synology_r1000_923+, zImage + rd.gz + hda1.tgz + Synology.sig. Platform: AMD Ryzen R1600, x86_64. Uploaded the DECRYPTED tar. Method reference: afflicted.sh/tpbreak.</p><h2>Source</h2><p>Downloaded from Synology's public download server: <a href="https://global.synologydownload.com/download/DSM/release/7.2.2/72806/DSM_DS923+_72806.pat" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://global.synologydownload.com/download/DSM/release/7.2.2/72806/DSM_DS923+_72806.pat</a>.</p><h2>Format and unpacking</h2><ul><li>Container: Synology signed <code>0xADBEEF</code> archive — <code>0xADBEEF</code> header magic, msgpack header + 64-byte Ed25519 signature, then 55 entries (entropy ~8.0 bits/byte from the start).</li><li>Encryption: each entry is XChaCha20-Poly1305 secretstream (libsodium); per-entry key = <code>crypto_kdf_derive_from_key(master_key, subkey_id, ctx)</code> with <code>subkey_id</code>/<code>ctx</code> from the header.</li><li>Tool: <a href="https://github.com/synacktiv/synodecrypt" rel="noopener noreferrer">synacktiv/synodecrypt</a> via a local libsodium (ctypes) + msgpack shim.</li><li>Key (reverse-engineered): the key table is baked into the proprietary <code>libsynocodesign.so</code>. I extracted <code>libsynocodesign.so.7</code> from <code>usr/lib/</code> inside <code>hda1.tgz</code> of the plaintext DSM 7.0.1-42218 DS920+ <code>.pat</code>, then brute-force-recovered the keys by sliding a 32-byte window over the <code>.so</code> and testing against the real target: Ed25519 signing key <code>64faba48feec6c8a2484d2489a11418a0e980317a9cc6b392f1041925b293fe0</code> at <code>.so</code> offset <code>0x23830</code>; XChaCha20 master key <code>078a7529a07a998cffadb87d7378993b7d9ccfa7171f5c47f150838a6a7caf61</code> at adjacent offset <code>0x23858</code>. Keys are stable across DSM 7.x (a 2021 library decrypts this 2024 build).</li></ul><h2>Verification</h2><ul><li>Ed25519 header signature verified OK.</li><li>All per-entry BLAKE2b checksums matched.</li><li>Output is a valid tar: <code>VERSION</code> productversion=7.2.2, build=72806, unique=<code>synology_r1000_923+</code>.</li><li>Includes <code>zImage</code>, <code>rd.gz</code>, <code>hda1.tgz</code>, <code>Synology.sig</code>.</li></ul><h2>Contents</h2><ul><li>Kernel <code>zImage</code> + <code>rd.gz</code> ramdisk + <code>hda1.tgz</code> rootfs.</li><li>Platform: AMD Ryzen R1600, x86_64.</li><li>Uploaded the <strong>decrypted</strong> tar.</li></ul><h2>Credit</h2><p>Method reference: <a href="https://afflicted.sh/" rel="noopener noreferrer">afflicted.sh</a> / tpbreak.</p>

Original

by admin · 2h ago #0
VendorSynology
ProductDiskStation DS923+
VersionDSM 7.2.2-72806
Licensevendor-proprietary, research use only

Source: Synology public download server (https://global.synologydownload.com/download/DSM/release/7.2.2/72806/DSM_DS923+_72806.pat). PACKED: Synology signed 0xADBEEF archive (header magic 0xADBEEF, entropy 8.000 bits/byte from the start), msgpack header + Ed25519 signature, 55 entries encrypted with XChaCha20-Poly1305 secretstream (libsodium), per-entry key via crypto_kdf_derive_from_key(master_key, subkey_id, ctx). Decrypted with synacktiv/synodecrypt (https://github.com/synacktiv/synodecrypt) + a local libsodium(ctypes)/msgpack shim. Keys reverse-engineered from libsynocodesign.so.7 (extracted from usr/lib of hda1.tgz in the plaintext DSM 7.0.1-42218 DS920+ .pat): Ed25519 signing key 64faba48...5b293fe0 at .so offset 0x23830, XChaCha20 master key 078a7529...6a7caf61 at 0x23858 (recovered by brute-force window-matching against the real .pat signature/first-entry; keys stable across DSM 7.x). Verification: Ed25519 header signature OK; all per-entry BLAKE2b checksums matched; output is a valid tar - VERSION productversion=7.2.2 build=72806 unique=synology_r1000_923+, zImage + rd.gz + hda1.tgz + Synology.sig. Platform: AMD Ryzen R1600, x86_64. Uploaded the DECRYPTED tar. Method reference: afflicted.sh/tpbreak.